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Criminalized violence and the process of
civilisation: a reappraisal1
Gerd Schwerhoff
Translation : Lukas Hoffmann
1 The history of crime deals mainly with deviancy and the violation of norms. Nevertheless,
historians of crime try to study the social standard as well. While looking at deviancy,
they hope to shed light on people’s attitudes, for example, towards property, sexuality
and morality or towards the authorities. However, the most intensively debated topic, it
seems,  has  been for  quite  some time the  issue  of  violence.  We are  confronted with
‘violence’ in the court records in a variety of facets: murder and manslaughter, bodily
harm and robbery, infanticide and rape. The level of violent crime is viewed as a central
indicator  of  the forms and functions of  violence in social  life.  And with the help of
criminal statistics, criminal historians try to measure the degree of violence in a given
society.
2 For the last few years the homicide rate has been regarded as a quantifiable indicator of
the  degree  of  violence  in  a  particular  period.  The  homicide  rate  in  present-day
criminology is the rate which shows the annual average of deaths caused by physical
violence  in  a  population  of  100,000.  Twenty  years  ago,  scholars  concerned  with  the
history  of  crime  adopted  this  measurement.  In  1983,  Lawrence  Stone  made  the
criminological analysis of T.R. Gurr, which had been published two years earlier, known
to the community of historians. Gurr had summarised the results of fragmented studies
on violent crimes in England and projected them on the time scale.  Stone developed
Gurr’s analysis of trends even further and came to the frequently cited conclusion «that
medieval English society was twice as violence-prone as early modern English society,
and  early  modern  English  society  at  least  five  times  more  violence-prone  than
contemporary English society»2. So both argue that a clear, long-term decline of violence
had taken place. Subsequently, a lively debate unfolded whose course cannot be repeated
(in detail) here. Soon, this debate crossed over the borders of England and uncovered
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varied new empirical data and led to an exchange on the methodology and the theory of
criminal history.
3 In 1996 a  programmatic  anthology entitled The  Civilization  of  Crime took stock of  the
developments in historical research on crime3. In the introduction, its editors stated that
historians of criminality had been evading the most interesting challenges for a long
time,  namely  international  comparison  and  analysis  of  long-term  developments.
Recently, however, a surprising mutual agreement could be seen emerging in the field of
criminalized  personal  violence  which  seemed  to  prove  that  interpersonal  physical
violence –  violence  exercised  by  the  state  was  not  explicitly mentioned  here –  had
decreased from its level in the Middle Ages. All relevant authors agreed that «the decline
in the level of interpersonal violence took place sometime between the 17th and the 18th
century – a period marked by the rise of state control over the population, but a time
considerably before the great wave of urban-industrial growth and expansion»4. Finally
they concluded that, in connection with this empirical verification of a general trend,
Norbert Elias’ theory of civilisation, the central theses of which are widely accepted, had
gained new credit among historians.
4 In 1939, Norbert Elias published his book, About the Process of Civilization5. In this major
work, the German sociologist tried to trace the changes in human behaviour from the 12th
to the 18th century. The analysis of table manners using guidebooks on moral discipline
and handbooks on etiquette (Zucht- und Benimmbücher) as the primary sources is the main
topic of his presentation. In this analysis, he describes how nose-blowing and spitting
were subjected to an increasingly restrictive canon of rules. But also other expressions of
emotion were governed by a process of civilisation, as Elias explains in the last chapters
of the first volume of his opus magnum: Apart from the sexual drive, it is above all with
die Angriffslust (that is aggressiveness – in German, ‘the lust for attacking someone’) that
he is concerned here6.  According to his description, this drive was also subject to the
fundamental historical trend from ‘external constraint’ to ‘internal constraint’, a shift of
the governing of emotions from the outside to the inside of the person. Elias does not
perceive  this  increasing  internalisation  of  outer  constraints  as  increasing  individual
autonomy,  but  conversely  as  the  result  of  a  transformation of  social  constraint  into
personal constraint. Other secular processes are intertwined with this development, for
example the tendency for increased functional specialisation in the working process or
the development of a state-monopoly of power.
5 After having been a long-time outsider to the scientific community, Elias has, since the
1970s, progressively won recognition as he author of an important and inspiring classic
study.  The renaissance of  Elias’ paradigm in historical  research on criminality is  due
above all to Pieter Spierenburg. Bearing in mind Elias’ theories and his own research on
early modern Amsterdam, the Dutch historian elaborated his interpretations of homicide
rates and further developed them in a creative manner. Recently has he summarised his
point of view in this journal and answered the rhetorical question: «Violence and the
Civilising Process: Does it work?» clearly with a ‘yes’.  As he sees it, his perspective is
backed up by a phalanx of historians from the Anglo-Saxon world, whereas a number of
historians in Continental Europe – among them Martin Dinges and myself – take a stand
against the civilisation-theoretical interpretation7.
6 The description of the main lines is very simple. On the one hand, those sceptical of such
a far-reaching interpretation of homicide rates and the critics of the Elias paradigm are
not confined to Continental Europe. In a review of the anthrology just mentioned, the
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Dutch historian Herman Roodenburg remarks with surprise that – in contrast to what the
emphatic  introduction  suggests –  only  two  authors  refer  to  Norbert  Elias  in  detail
(namely,  apart  from Eva Österberg,  Spierenburg himself!)8.  No one who has read Jim
Sharpe’s critical remarks in the debate with Stone about the value of homicide rates9 will
be surprised to hear that Sharpe mentions Elias only in passing in his article. On the other
hand, there are enough «Continental» voices who concede that homicide rates – with or
without reference to Elias – are central to furthering knowledge about criminality in the
past and who distinctly criticise any cultural objections10. Hence, the dispute cuts right
through the international family of historians of crime. According to the protagonists of
this dispute, the «civilisation of violence» theory seems to be favoured by the majority of
historians.
7 The following considerations are aimed at questioning some of the central premises and
conclusions of  this approach.  By no means is  this meant to ignite a feud among the
community of  historians  of  crime,  particularly  as  there is  common agreement about
many aspects of it. Nevertheless, Pieter Spierenburg rightly claimed that there should be
not only an analysis of Elias’ original paradigm, but also of its creative developments11.
This is exactly what this article is all about. It focuses exclusively on the topic of ‘physical
violence’ and not on other issues of Elias’ work12. Likewise excluded from the following
analysis is the criminality of the 19th and 20th centuries whose developments would make
an article on their own. In regard to the empirical data used, I am going to deal with the
findings  of  German historians  since  their  work tends  to  be  unduly  neglected in  the
international  debate.  To  integrate  this  research,  heretofore  inaccessible  to  those
unfamiliar with the German language, into the discussions of the international research
community could be a rewarding by-product of this article13.
 
Homicide rates
8 First, the empirical basis: «Was the long-term decline of violence, from the 14th to the
middle of the 20th century, real?»14. In his most recent article, Spierenburg himself hardly
discusses  the  data  systematically,  but  deals  with  only  some  aspects  of  their
interpretation. He summarily refers to Manuel Eisner’s re-analysis of European criminal
history research. Taking 60 research papers, the Swiss sociologist distilled 290 estimated
homicide rates recorded in the pre-statistical period15. Neither a comprehensive list nor
an analysis of these data can be presented here, nor is this necessary16. Nevertheless, we
still have to deal with this source material. In doing so, we have to distinguish the late
medieval period (from the 13th to the 15th century) and the early modern period (from the
16th to the 18th century).
9 Extremely high rates for homicide circulate for the 14th century in particular: spectacular
front-runners are, for example, the English university town of Oxford, in the period from
1342 to 1348 with a homicide rate of 110; or the metropolis of Florence, whose rate of 52
during the years from 1352 to 1355 is exceeded by a value of 68 in the period from 1382 to
1385. Similarly high rates can be found in Central Europe during the same time: Freiburg
i. Br., for instance, had a homicide rate of between 60 and 90 in the second half of the 14th
century; the Moravian town of Olmütz, a rate of 77; and Krakow one of 6417. In the basis of
the autopsy reports, which are viewed as being especially reliable, Spierenburg worked
out a homicide rate of 47 to 59 for Amsterdam during a few years of the 15th century18.
Significantly lower are the values for some towns in the south and south-east of Germany:
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For Basel, a rate between 25 and 30 was calculated for the period from 1376 to 1456;
similar rates were reached for Regensburg (from 1324 to 1350: 25) and Eger (from 1310 to
1390: 30)19. But even lower figures are easily found, especially for the 15th century. In his
recent  study  of  Constance  from  1430  to  1472,  Peter  Schuster  finds  16  assaults  and
homicides between 1468 and 1472 and thus calculates an average rate of 6.2. In Cologne,
the homicide rate had a value of 10 during the years from 1468 to 1481, according to the
Totenbuch, where deaths caused by violence were registered by the judge20. For Brussels, a
comparable rate of 12 can be estimated in the 15th century21. Finally, there are relatively
low figures for the Hanseatic cities of  Wismar (from 1343 to 1428:  15)  and Stralsund
(1310-1399: 9)22.
 
Table 1: Homicide rates in late medieval Europe (= number of deaths caused by violent acts per
100,000 inhabitants)
Regensburg: 1324-1350 25
Nürnberg: 14th century (individual years) 25 - 60
Oxford: 1342-1348 90 - 120
Freiburg i. Br.: Second half of 14th century >50
Olmütz: 1353-1389 (individual years) 77
Antwerpen: 1356/7, 1367/8, 1372-87 23
Florenz: 1352-5
1380-368
152
Krakau: 1361-1400 64
Basel: 1376-1456 25-30
Brüssel: 1404-1499 1
Köln: 1468-1481 10.7
Sources: Krakau, Regensburg: Schüssler (1998, pp. 216ff); Nürnberg: Schüssler (1991) p. 122); Oxford:
Hammer (1978, p. 11); Freiburg: Wettmann-Junblut (1997, p. 93); Olmütz: Schüssler (1994, p. 166);
Antwerpen: Schüssler (1998, p. 218); Florenz: Becker (1976, p. 287); Basel: Simon-Muscheid (1991; pp.
30f); Brüssel: Vanhemelryck (1981, p. 105); Köln: Schwerhoff (1991, p. 282).
10 This gives us some figures to play with. The validity of the listed data is often highly
questionable.  First  of  all,  they  all  rely  on  highly  heterogeneous  source  materials:
Achtregister (lists of escaped and proscribed suspects) are compared with indictments,
lists of executed delinquents with entries in Wundenbüchern (records of violent acts) or
court bills. It is evident that a different subset of criminalized violence is looked into with
each of these partial data. Secondly, the judicial-normative basis in space and time is
extremely variable. That there are no relevant sources for the late-13th century is only an
indicator of their dependency on the respective norms. Originally, homicide was not a
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penalized  crime.  Until  far  into  the  early  modern period,  it  was  possible  to  regulate
manslaughter by monetary compensation payable by the culprit to the victim’s family23.
11 In many cases the sources are as heterogeneous as the categories for the various criminal
acts. Did court officials register only mere (affective) homicides or did they also include
(wilful) murders? Did accidents or deaths in the context of feud violence prior to the ages
of larger conflicts and wars find their way into the statistics? And what about lethal
violence in the context of robbery?24. Another central problem is calculating populations.
Usually  the  number  of  inhabitants  can  be  estimated  only  roughly,  short-term
demographic  changes  cannot  be  taken  into  consideration.  As  difficult  as  such  an
undertaking is for the early modern period, attempts to do the same for the Middle Ages
border  on  a  juggling  act:  Given,  for  example,  in  his  classic  analysis  of  13th-century
England, multiplies the number of Doomesday Books mentioned in the inventory lists of
households from 1086 by five in order to arrive at the total population figure of that time
and multiplies this again by 2.5 to trace back the assumed growth of the population over
the 150 years in between25.
12 Most proponents of the hypothesis of a civilisation of crime saw these and other problems
with the applied methods of  quantification and did not  hesitate  to  acknowledge the
difficulties of any such calculations. However, they argued, one should not exaggerate
historical  scepticism.  Eisner,  for  instance,  countered  the  criticism  with  «the  socio-
scientific  expectation  that,  with  a  sufficiently  large  number  of  analyses,  the  various
sources of error would neutralise each other, at least to such an extent that the rough
structure of secular trends becomes visible». In his view, there were no systematic errors
in his sample26. Another strategy rests on the fragmentary nature of the existing sources
which – in the view of some scholars – only supports the assumption that the resulting
figures are trustworthy minimal figures.  Would «more complete» source material not
increase these figures for obvious reasons? Due to these considerations there is a certain
tendency (explicit  or implicit)  among scholars to favour the highest figures as ‘those
closest to reality’. Even though Spierenburg himself denies, in his most recent article,
that  anybody  would  «advocate  a  method  of  always  accepting  the  highest  figures
reported»,  he  argued  slightly  differently  in  an  earlier  article:  at  least  «court  cases
involving arrested killers» and «record listing all cases with identified killers (including
fugitive suspects) should be taken into consideration only when they are relatively high»
27. Martin Schüssler,  whose works form a central reference for recent studies, interprets
his material similarly. In contrast to Spierenberg (!), he barely touches on preliminary
methodological considerations. A critical evaluation of the source material, for example,
is  completely lacking.  Thus,  his  quantitative analyses are highly questionable from a
methodological standpoint. When he calculates a homicide rate of 25 from his Nuremberg
source material, for example, but finds a value of 65 for the year 1392, then it is the latter
which he views as being «the likelier one»28. Furthermore, years for which there is no
source material are excluded in Schüssler’s interpretation due to the assumption that the
data of these years had been poorly registered. Of course, this may be true. But it is also
possible  that  there  were  no  sanctions  during  those  years  or  even  no  deaths  to  be
registered at all. And he often applies the same method when reproducing the research
results of fellow scholars29.
13 The projection of homicide rates is only one possible source for a systematic biasof the
source  material.  Population  figures,  too,  are  traditionally  over-  rather  than
underestimated30. Furthermore, there are many other problems with the measurement of
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«the basic total figure for the local population». Apart from England, which is an early
exception to the rule, we have figures only for medieval towns. Apparently this is the
seed  of  a  systematic  bias.  Thus  Beattie’s  figures  for  the  17th and  18 th centuries,  for
example, hint at a significantly higher homicide rate in the urban context (cf. table 2).
Generally speaking, it is quite difficult to ascertain whether such discrepancies between
town and countryside are rooted in the different behaviour of people living in rural areas
compared  to  those  living  in  towns  or  if  there  are  institutional  reasons  for  these
discrepancies. The impact of urban courts went far beyond the town wall especially in the
late medieval period. Neither did the culprit and the victim have to originate from the
same area for which the respective judicial  court was responsible,  nor did the crime
necessarily have to take place within the boundaries of the local jurisdiction. Only rarely
do we learn something about such details as, for example, in the Nuremberg book of
outlaws from the year 1392: here we read about a journeyman, who had been banished for
the rest of his life, «that he had stabbed a woman, who later died at Bamberg, with a
knife»31. It is into this context that I would like to put my remarks about the pseudo-
objectivity of the measurement of «manslaughters per 100,000 inhabitants»32. In contrast
to modern small-sized villages, medieval towns of only 5,000 inhabitants could already be
focal points of violence as well as foci of jurisdiction. It remains debatable whether the
projection of small basic units onto this modern measurement of a homicide rate is – in a
statistical or a mathematical sense – validor not: Two manslaughters in a town of 10,000
people would already make a value of 20.
14 What can these figures for the Middle Ages prove? One could interpret them as a trend
curve which shows a dramatic climax in the 14th century, in comparison to the previous
13th century and the following 15 th century.  Such an interpretation would be highly
questionable because of the above problems with the analysis of the source material. But
tailoring these data to fit Elias’ paradigm is an equally shaky proposition. The calculation
of homicide rates from the 13th to the 15th centuries is fraught with so many problems
that a comparison between these figures or even the determination of a trend on this
basis seems to be methodologically inadmissible33.  No doubt, the level of violence was
relatively high in the late Middle Ages. But that is all we can safely say for that period.
15 For  the  early  modern  times,  things  are  different  indeed.  The  number  of  sources  is
considerably higher and so is the density of the source material. However this does not
mean that the quality of most of the data improves dramatically. Moreover, the number
of relevant analyses is still limited. As far as France is concerned, Spierenburg rightly
complains about the total absence of comparable data. There are no accountable analyses
of serial sources covering a longer period of time for the German-speaking territories
either.  Fragmented figures,  as those on 17th-century Frankfurt-am-Main,  according to
which the number of murders halved during that period and further declined in the 18th
century, are worth being mentioned explicitly since they are so much the exception to
the rule34.
16 From the 15th century onwards, though, there does exist a new type of sources in some
regions and towns,  namely the registers of  official  body inspections (Totenbeschau)  in
cases  of  sudden death.  Such  body  inspections,  as  they  had  been  carried  out  by  the
Coroner  in  England,  have  already  been  mentioned  for  Amsterdam  and  Cologne  as
examples of this type of source material. For the period prior to the 17th century, there
are unfortunately  only  summary calculations  for  the Dutch metropolis.  According to
these figures, the homicide rate was approximately 28 for the period from 1524 to 1565,
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and between 21.1 and 24.2 for the selected years of  1560,  1570,  1580 and 159035.  For
Cologne, the data can be interpreted in more detail for the time between 1557 and 1620.
Unfortunately there are no records for  the following years and decades (cf. table 2).
Conversely, the practice of body inspections in Amsterdam did not resume until 1667, but
for the ensuing period, long-term serial data can be listed. By far the most valuable set of
data are still those figures presented by Cockburn in 1991 for the English county of Kent
on the basis of coroner inquests which cover a period from 1560 well into early modern
times36.
 
Table 2: Homicide rates in 16th and early 17th century (=number of deaths caused by violent acts,
per 100,000 inhabitants)
Kent Köln Amsterdam
 1557-63: 13.5 1560-62: 73
1561-81: 3.5 1574-81: 14.5 1566-67: 82
    1571-73: 36
    1577-80: 46
1582-01: 5.6 1582-01:  9.1   
    1585: 31
1602-21: 3.9 1602-20:  7.7   
Sources: Cockburn (1991, p. 78); Schwerhoff (1991, p. 283); Blastenbrei (1995, p. 71)
Note: The data from Cologne are not mere random samples, as Schüssler (1998), p. 220, wrote; for
this table, the data has been re-organised and newly calculated.
 
Table 3: Homicide rates in 17th and 18th century (=number of deaths caused by violent acts, per
100,000 inhabitants)
Kent Surrey Amsterdam
Urban Rural
1561-81: 3.5       
1582-01: 5.6       
1602-21: 3.9       
1622-41: 3.8       
1642-61: 3.7       
1662-81: 4.3 1660-79: 8.1 4.3 1667-1679: 3.5
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1682-01: 3.6 1680-99: 5.0 4.7 1693-1709: 10.2
1702-21: 2.7 1700-19: 3.9 2.9 1710-1726: 8.3
1722-41: 1.6 1720-39: 2.8 2.4   
1742-61: 2.0 1740-59: 2.0 1.6 1752-1767: 2.5
1762-81: 1.9 1760-79: 1.7 1.1 1768-1783: 3.8
1782-01: 1.8 1780-02: 0.9 0.9 1784-1799: 2.6
1802-21: 1.4     1800-1816: 1.5
1822-41: 0.9       
Sources: Cockburn (1991, p. 78); Beattie (1986, p. 108); Spierenburg (1996, p. 83).
17 Though the data presented here show greater validity than those for the medieval period,
considerable problems with their interpretation remain. Many questions have already
been raised by James Cockburn, who – as Spierenburg rightly notes – tends to minimise
the relevance of his data for an analysis of the development of violence or negates such a
development altogether. Up to now his arguments have not been sufficiently discussed.
Insufficiently reflected, for example, is the question of  whether there is a connection
between homicide rates and violent offences in general. Apart from some excursions in
this direction, there is no appropriate basis in source material for quantifing physical
injuries and other violent offences37. In order to compensate this lack, it is the explicit or
implicit premise of the civilisation of violence thesis that homicides are a valid indicator
of all  forms of criminalized physical  violence – if  only because it  is  the only existing
somewhat «hard» indicator left. In fact, such offences can be seen as an extreme pole of a
continuum of  unspectacular  violent  acts  running from mere  threats  and quarrels  to
severe physical injury38. This does not mean, however, that there is a continuing stable
relation between the two factors over a long period of time. Most of the people killed by
violent acts in the early modern period died because of their injuries, due to blood loss or
of  infections,  which  they  would  have  no  doubt  survived  in  the  20th century.  In  a
comparison which aims at encompassing several epochs, categories of modern criminal
statistics such as «attempted murder» and «severe bodily injury» have to be added to the
homicides. One could argue here that medicine had not progressed significantly until the
19th century,  but  there  are  other  relevant  factors  that  need  to  be  taken  into
consideration.  The accessibility  and the  use  of  weapons,  for  example,  seem to  be  of
central importance – a point which is primarily responsible for the enormous differences
in the violent death statistics between Europe and the US. Still, these figures would not
make us view the United States as being less civilised. The majority of violent deaths in
the 16th and early 17th centuries, according to James Cockburn’s analysis for Kent, was
caused by thrust weapons, whereas, from the 17th century onwards, the proportion of
firearms and other tools has grown continually39. Does this mean, then, that potential
thrust weapons have increasingly disappeared from daily life? Or are they just no longer
used to settle disputes? These questions illustrate the necessity of a qualitative analysis of
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individual violence in the cultural context, which will be dealt with in the third part of
this article.
18 Despite the methodological reservations, historical research, especially that concerned
with pre-modern times, is always faced with a difficult source basis, and it is legitimate to
make the most  of  quantifying methods.  Looking at  both the data and the numerous
scattered hints, the impression is substantiated that the level of violence decreases from
the 16th to the 18th century. Pieter Spierenburg has the merit of having pointed out this
trend. However I would like to qualify this immediately in two respects: First there is no
evidence that this is a long-term process. All that can be proven somewhat empirically is
merely the fact that there has been a change in the levels of violence within a period of
time that can be limited to 200 or 300 years. By the middle of the 18th century at the
latest, the level of lethal violence seems to have levelled out at a comparatively low level
in England and on the Continent40. This does not apply to all parts of Europe, though, not
for example to the Mediterranean area, where a distinct culture of violence prevailed for
a  longer  period  of  time41.  And  this  brings us  to  my  second  qualification,  which  is
concerned with the dramatic difference between the graphs for one individual territory
as well as the discrepancies between the respective geographic areas of research. There is
at least the same need for an explanation for those discrepancies as there is one for the
overall trend. Thus, the county of Kent shows a low homicide rate for the 16th century
which  is  reached  by  Amsterdam  only  in  the  second  half  of  the  18th century.  By
comparison,  the  figures  from Cologne are  already significantly  higher,  but  the  rates
calculated by Peter Blastenbrei for late 16th century Rom seem to be exorbitant.  The
privileged observation of a unidirectional development seen through the glasses of the
theory of civilisation tend to obscure such significant differences. Elias’ paradigm is about
to become Elias’ bias – at least in the context of the debate about violence.
 
The civilising process
19 Here we have arrived at the second pole of the discussion, the theory of civilisation as
such. Pieter Spierenburg pleads for theoretically oriented historical research. According
to his approach, theory and empirical data should always relate to one another without
the empirical data acting blindly or the theory drifting away into unfounded speculation42
.  In the main, I  agree on this.  However the procedure just outlined must not lead to
insecure empirical data being backed by a problematic theory or vice versa, and central
problems being thus obscured. This is exactly the case for the theory of civilisation, its
fields of research and the discussion about violence in particular.
20 Surely some of  the aspects brought forward by Spierenburg in the wake of  Elias are
basically not contentious. Hence the connection between the development and frequency
of individual violence, on the one hand, and the development of a monopoly of power by
the state, on the other hand, can hardly be dismissed. By the way, the terminology used
by  Elias  here  is  less  problematic  than  Spierenburg  suggests.  Elias  talks  about  the
«monopoly of power» clearly in the sense of a ‘monopolisation of legitimate physical
power’43. In doing so, he follows explicitly the language of Max Weber, who defined the
state as a «political institution which can make use of the monopoly of legitimate physical
constraint»44. Elias talks uninhibitedly of a «monopoly of force»45. Spierenburg’s attempt
to translate this into ‘military monopoly’ is too narrow, even though military and tax
control indeed represent two important aspects of the monopoly of power, according to
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Elias. Another important aspect for the history of violence, which Spierenburg touches on
only in passing in this context, is the development of criminal law by the state, with its
severe punishments. In the course of this development an increase in the exercise of state
power was seen. The frequency of executions and other bodily punishments increased46.
From the standpoint of the theory of civilisation, the monopolisation of power by the
state had two opposite consequences: On one side, there was a decrease in interpersonal
violence, an intensified internal pressure exercised by the state on its subjects, and, on
the other, there was an externalisation of power onto the intergovernmental level in the
form of state-building wars47.
21 Our  goal  should  now  be  to  look  in  more  detail  at  the  connection  between  the
development  of  state  monopoly  of  power  and  the  changein  individual  violence.  In
following Norbert Elias’  theory of civilisation, however, Spierenburg takes exactly the
opposite  route.  He  refers  to  a  historic  «macro-narrative»  which  seems  to  make  the
empirical  data  explainable  by  a  plain  theoretical  explanation.  By  fitting  it  into  the
occidental process of civilisation, he thus officially ordains a historical trend which makes
a more detailed analysis seem superfluous. This model is, in the end, a reductionist view
in which the frequency of violence is dependent on the degree of affect control. This
affect control is again connected with a slowly increasing development of state monopoly
of power and social interdependencies: «Thus, the long-term decline in homicide resulted
from a taming of aggressive impulses in daily social intercourse, which in its turn was a
function of the rise and growth in power of states in Europe»48.
22 A number of objections to this simple reductionist model can be made. In my view, Elias’
idea of violence and aggression seems problematic. He conceptualises them as if they
were just there naturally, as a proposition of the human being, which can be socially
integrated and abolished only secondarily. From this viewpoint, the changes in the forms
of violence always represent the dependent variable, whereas the social conditions of
society with their  twisted structure and the expanding power of  the state appear as
anonymous figures responsible for that process. The state apparatus of repression thus
forms a somewhat stable lid for the social pressure cooker, slowly reducing the inevitable
eruptive outbreaks of passions while trying to prevent them altogether. That Elias viewed
violence as a social habit that is learned like any other human behaviour, as Spierenburg
writes, could be surmised from some of Elias theoretic statements. His empirical analysis
of knightly violence in the Middle Ages tells a completely different story, though. It is in
this  naïve  and  prejudiced  interpretation  of  the  sources  that  the  various  points  of
criticism, which I will not repeat here, originate49.
23 By no means is this supposed to be a simple know-it-all criticism of the work of a classic
whose core cannot be shaken by minor, almost inevitable corrections in detail. Like no
other modern thinker in modern times, Elias related empirical data and theory to each
other.  He rejected programmatically Weber’s idea of a construction of  ideal-types,  of
models which can fathom reality by an abstract terminology. His process of civilisation
aims at being both a theory of social processes and their empirical proof. This has far-
reaching consequences. In Elias’ work there is an unclear relation between empirical data
and theoretical  premises.  The  mention of evidence  by the  sources  is  suggestive  and
episodic. Hardly ever does he quote in a methodologically controlled and controllable
way. Possible criticism of his analyses can thus be rejected on various levels again and
again, depending on what is needed: empirical objections can be devalued by referring to
the process of civilisation, criticism of the concept as such can be countered with facts.
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Thus, Elias’ theory is immune to possible attempts at falsification. Spierenburg chooses a
similar strategy when he says that the theory of civilisation is «based on observed past
trends and has no room for evolution» in order to defy ideologically critical reservations50
.  Yet  the  theory is  used again as  a  «seeing aid»  in order  to  show that  there  was  a
measurably higher degree of violence in the late Middle Ages and that its gradual decline
in the early modern times was part of  a secular trend.In my opinion,  the borderline
between a precisely fitting alliance of  empirical  data and theory,  on one side,  and a
circular reasoning, on the other, has been unduly crossed here.
24 Spierenburg advances many anti-critical arguments with which the older Norbert Elias
impatiently confronted his critics time and again. He counters all criticism against the
ideological character of his theory of civilisation, against its teleological, evolutionistic
main feature,  against  the transfiguration of  modern times and the distorted,  cliched
perception of  the  Middle  Ages  with  conceptual  remarks  made by  Elias:  processes  of
civilisation had direction but they were blind, unintentional, unplanned processes; they
had no beginning and no end, they went on irregularly and intermittently; there could be
backdrops,  periods  of  de-civilisation  and,  yes,  these  processes  were  even  primarily
reversible.  But  for  judging the  value  of  a  theory  correctly,  some general  conceptual
remarks are of little help. Instead, their application in practice must be the main criteria.
As inspiring as singular ideas of Elias may be, his whole model for the discussion about
violence is restricting.
25 The continuous change in empirical data and theory can also be observed in the handling
of the French model. To what extent the French way of civilisation can be viewed as the
model case for a process of civilisation through the royal court or to what extent there
are alternative ways of development remain an open question. Spierenburg advocates the
latter point of  view and explains that a refinement of habits at  the court in no way
necessarily goes hand in hand with a subduing of violence – after all, the royals were still
wearing  weapons  at  court.  Their  renunciation  of  violence  was  based  on  external
constraints  rather  than on automatic  self-constraint51.  For  one  thing,  Spierenburg  is
inconsistent with his teacher here: Elias explicitly emphasised that the «affect household
of a human being» had to be viewed as a whole, that various «utterances of urges», such
as hunger, sexual drive or the drive to attack, were inseparably intertwined. This quite
mechanical connection once more casts a bright light on the questionability of Elias’ drive
theory. But the second part of the argument is much more important because it operates
from a theoretical element which is again and again viewed as being central to the theory
of civilisation: the transition from external constraints to self-constraint. Indeed, this is a
very original and highly interesting figure of thought. But how is this development to be
controlled empirically? In regard to table manners, Elias has put forward a number of
sources which actually hint at an internalisation of certain modes of behaviour. But for
the sphere of violence mere arbitrariness seems to govern any analysis. That there were
mere external constraints curbing the exercise of violence in the Middle Ages seems to
have been evident  for  the sociologist.  By using the roughly outlined Dark Ages as  a
starting point,  he was much better able to contrast the process of civilisation, which
originated in the court.  Violence in the Middle Ages is portrayed as being controlled
externally, the avoidance of violence later on, however, was a successful form of self-
constraint. There are no detectable criteria for this historic operationalization. Instead,
an  external  constraint  can  be  constructed  again,  if  necessary,  as  Spierenburg’s
argumentation shows, in order to remove inconsistencies from Elias’ paradigm. At other
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points of  the controversy,  the self-constraint argument is  omitted completely.  In the
process of the devolution of the Soviet Union and during the formation of non-pacifistic
islands within Western metropolises,  there was «a weakening of the state monopoly»
which then, of course, was accompanied with a rise in the homicide rate52. In these cases,
a successful internalisation of drives cannot have taken place, otherwise the weakening of
the state’s monopole of power would hardly suffice to explain the new increase in the HR.
It is generally questionable how the curbing of human affects in daily life, on one side,
can go together with an increase of violence in wars and civil wars reaching as far as
genocide in modern times, on the other– at least, if  one represents the «drives» of a
human being as a unit, which was what Elias postulated.
 
Habits and meanings
26 Apart from the macro-historical  approach to interpersonal violence,  with the help of
homicide rates and the theory of civilisation, the micro-historical perspective mentioned
at the beginning has been successfully established and has produced numerous studies on
the  phenomenology  of  everyday  violence.  These  analyses  revolve  around  «the  twin
themes of ritual and honour», as Spierenburg rightly notes. In his view, these were «the
only serious objection» to an application of the theory of civilisation to violence53. Would
the  binding  of  an  offender  to  an  all-encompassing  code  of  honour  and  the  strict
ritualization of most duels not implicitly mean a control of affects and thus the exact
opposite of what violence is all about in the theory of civilisation – namely unrestrained
violence? In his discussion of these topics, Spierenburg comes to the conclusion that the
perspective  of  the  theory  of  civilisation can be  combined with  the  latest  studies  on
honour and ritual.  And he refers to his own attempts, his integration of cultural and
statistical approaches to the analysis of homicide rates in Amsterdam.
27 Let us take a brief look at these attempts. The nucleus of this ideal-model of analysis is a
system «of  two related but  distinct  axes».  The poles  of  the first  axis  are  formed by
«impulsive violence versus planned or ‘rational’ violence», those of the second by «ritual
or expressive violence versus instrumental  violence»54.  His analysis of  a sample from
Amsterdam court  cases  (the  body  inspection  records  do  not  provide  the  contextual
evidence  needed  for  an  adequate  analysis)  shows  that  impulsive  violence  was  quite
dominant up to around 1750, whereas its share declined sharply from the middle of the 18
th century onwards. With this finding, Spierenburg combines another observation, which
is concerned with the victim–offender relation. Impulsive violence in the form of sudden
outbreaks  of  aggression  between  strangers  or  companions  was  found  primarily  in
alehouses and on the street. Since approximately 1720, however, he notes an increase of
intrafamilial violence in comparison to the violence against outsiders, «a shift from the
killing of strangers to the killing of intimates»55. In addition, this intrafamilial violence
was to be seen more and more as  an expression of  long-term tensions,  for  example
between spouses, rather than as impulsive panic reactions.
28 Spierenburg’s suggestion is undoubtedly the work of a pioneer. Without such attempts at
categorization, a further-reaching analysis of violence will hardly be possible. What we
need  is  a  set  of  terminological  instruments  which  give  the  seemingly  amorphous
phenomenon of violence a sharper profile. This two-axis model can hardly be the best
solution though. Among other things, Eva Lacour, a psychologist dealing with history,
criticised the comparison of impulsive and rationally planned violence as inadequate and
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proposed a three-dimensional analysis instead: motivation (angry or unplanned), form
(ritual/wilful or uncontrolled) and planning (planned or unplanned)56. Both of these two
works57 fail, however, with respect to a methodological problem: the idea of attributing
single cases to the respective poles of the model can hardly be understood – and where
such a categorization is understandable it  seems to me very problematic.  Lacour,  for
example,  works  with  a  highly  heterogeneous  set  of  «types  of  offenders»,  to  whose
configuration the reasons for the conflict and the occasion of the conflict, the place of the
crime, offender and victim are used arbitrarily to characterise the respective type. «Fight
for property» is thus juxtaposed with «conflict of honour», «revenge» with «alehouse
conflicts»58.  In doing so,  the author herself  admits that many conflicts over property
could have a strong aspect of honour, for example, or that many types of conflict could be
understood as aggression out of revenge. Her method, which is to select the dominant
motives in a single case, seems arbitrary and exemplifies the difficulties connected with a
solid categorisation of acts of violence on various levels. To put a question mark behind
some  of  her  findings,  which  themselves  seem  to  question  usual  commonplaces  of
research, is appropriate. Observations such as that violent conflicts were rarely preceded
by  threats,  that  conflicts  happened  quickly,  directly  and  were  uncontrolled  become
questionable when the high rate of insults –18.3% for the county of Virneburg, higher
than all  acts  of  violence  taken together  (13.4%) –  are  excluded from the  analysis  of
violence59. Because it is here that those interactions took place which could have led to
physical violence as well, but which did not!
29 The debate about a sensible categorisation of acts of violence has thus just begun and it is
highly  welcome.  It  is  therefore  especially  unfortunate  that  Spierenburg  reads  his
observations as evidence for the theory of civilisation and thus jumps to conclusions
where further questions would be more pertinent. In his point of view, impulsive and
ritual violence are combined with a low level of affect control, whereas instrumental and
rational violence can maintain their position in «civilised» forms of society. Here, too,
violence is being conceptualised as if it was a problem of the human nature which needs
to be socially restrained and abolished. From this viewpoint,  the changes in forms of
violence are always seen as dependent variables, whereas intertwined social relations and
the growth of state power figure as anonymous causes. Not only is this way of reasoning
conceptually questionable, but it remains also empirically doubtful, because – as we have
seen –  long-term trends  are  hard  to  detect.  Instead  we  find  a  shift  in  the  ‘faces  of
violence’, which furthermore is quite precisely localisable in time.
30 But Spierenburg objects to this micro-historical perspective that it «simply provides no
alternative  theory»60.  That  is  true,  if  one  accredits  a  ‘theory’  only  when it  claims  a
universal  applicability  similar  to  that  of  the  theory  of  civilisation.  Historical  macro-
narratives and theoretical scripts of modernisation are not experiencing a boom at the
moment;  in this respect the theory of civilisation is more or less the last theoretical
dinosaur of  its  kind.  But giving up the idea of  a  general  theory about the course of
historical  processes  does  not  mean  that  we  have  to  renounce  a  theory-oriented
perspective of analysis. Instead of dealing at length with the sociologists’ debate about
violence I would like to look at this discussion only briefly. In his review of research on
violence since 1997, the sociologist, Trutz von Trotha, complains about his colleagues’ low
productivity  on  violence.  According  to  him,  the  mainstream  of  modern  empirical
research was in fact not sociology of violence but a sociology of the reasons for violence.
The sociological theory as such, including the most frequently cited classics as Durkheim,
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Weber or Simmel, did not have much to offer in this respect. Elias, too, as one of the
«essential reference points in the current theory of violence», was no exception: «In fact,
the nucleus of Elias’ study is not concerned with violence, but with forms and changes in
the control of violence. […] Violence as such instead is understood mostly as an unbridled
«affect», as an impulse and as natural shamelessness about one’s own body and that of
the other». Trotha’s own research project opts for the phenomenological tradition of
sociology.  He  demands  a  «thick  description»  in  the  sense  of  Clifford  Geertz,  an
antireductionist and process-oriented microscopic analysis of violence. By proceeding in
such a way, the «Why?» would be replaced by questions of «What?» and «How?». Still, he
argues that he would be able to find and name sociological basic terms with a high degree
of universal applicability61.
31 The micro-historical  analyses  of  the recent  years  have already started to  tackle  this
programmatically postulated task of  perceiving violence as «meaningful  behaviour»62.
The consequences of such an approach can only be dealt with only briefly here63. I will
start by reconsidering the definition. This may sound strange at first, because physical
violence can be defined quite clearly as «harm done to another person». Instead I would
plead for widening the understanding of the term «bodily harm» for the purposes of
historical analysis, which means in concrete terms that mere threatening gestures such
as the drawing of knifes and also (or even in particular) «verbal violence» should be taken
into consideration as well. Many researchers might view the abolishment of the clear-cut
boundary of  «physical  violence» as  being problematic,  and especially  in the English-
speaking  world  this  term  may  be  regarded  as  being  «confusing  from  a  linguistic
standpoint»64. But it is no coincidence that early modern jurisdiction (which could indeed
separate insultsfrom manslaughter) was familiar with the term iniuria realis – a category
into which extremely brutal acts of violence were subsumed65.
32 This was undoubtedly a jurisdictional  reflex to social  practice.  In daily life,  insulting
words  often  marked  the  beginning  of  a  spiral  of  violence  which  could  end  with
manslaughter. Insults harm one’s honour, which was at least as important as the integrity
of the body. Or perhaps it was even part of this bodily integrity: metaphorical speaking,
this honour could be understood as something like a «second skin» which had to be
defended against violent attacks as much as the biological skin.
33 The definition of violence is thus closely connected with the question of its outward social
form and function. International research has provided us with a «thick description» of
everyday violent behaviour in late medieval  and early modern societies which shows
many variations in detail, but matches in outline. The acts of violence committed mostly
by male offenders followed a highly ritualised dramaturgy and can ideal-typically be
described as a process of escalation, which could start with teasing and insults, progress
to  threatening  gestures –  such  as  the  drawing  of  knives –  and  assault,  and  could
culminate  in  serious  injuries  and  manslaughter.  The  continuing  escalation  was  not
inevitable, there were a number of ways to de-escalate a tense situation. The argument is
quite convincing that the drawing of knives marked a kind of deadlock and made an exit
from  this  conflict  possible  for  both  parties without  either  of  them  losing  face.
Accordingly, the urge to defend one’s own honour in the forum of a virtual public was the
driving force behind the acts of violence. On these occasions honour functioned as a kind
of homogenising code which standardized the heterogeneous interests and motives. In
other words: no matter whether conflicts between neighbours, inheritance disputes or
conflicts with fellow members of the guild were at stake, these conflicts have always been
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translated in a language of honour and have thus been made negotiable on some level or
have otherwise been settled violently. Whether the protagonists fought with sharp words
or sharp knives does not make a difference, generally speaking66.
34 Such an  approach is  clearly  different  from that  of  the  perspective  of  the  theory  of
civilisation.  Physical  violence is  no longer conceptualised as  a  phenomenon which is
socially unwelcome at any place and at any time; instead it becomes describable and
interpretable in its social meaning. Taking the concept of social control as the analytical
reference point, one could say: physical violence in early modern times was not only the
object of this control, but its medium at the same time. In conflicts argued out violently
there was always the fulfilling of social norms at stake as well;  such conflicts can be
understood  as  attempts  to  sanction  breaks  with  the  norm.  Of  course,  these  two
dimensions –  social  control  of  violence  and  social  control  by  violence –  entertain  a
strained relationship.  The exercise of violence was sanctioned negatively both by the
authorities and by society in the Middle Ages as well as in early modern times; to bring
about peace, to keep and to re-establish it if necessary, was one of the most treasured
values of these centuries. Hence many of the measures taken aimed at a reconciliation
between  the  arguing  parties  or  at  a  reconciliation  of  the  offender  with  the  human
community and with God. Even the judicially sanctioned act of homicide – at least if it
presented itself as  a  situational  and unplanned manslaughter –  followed this  logic  of
functioning and remained within the private sphere of the compensational system far
into early modern times. Shameful punishments were suspended fairly often by acts of
mercy.  Throughout  this  whole  period,  the  regular  punishment  for  physical  violence
which did not have a lethal end remained the fine. Physical violence was not criminalized
consistently in pre-modern times, a fact which can be explained by its aforementioned
double-facetted character.
35 This approach goes together with categorisations only if these are not meant as a mere
confirmation of  a  given theory.  Of  course,  macro-historical  factors  can and must  be
included in a second step. For any study of the influence of demography, the levels of
urbanization and economic development may not seem to be very fashionable, but they
continue to be the necessary tools for the work of the historian. Particular attention must
be paid to the state as a generator of norms, of criminal procedure and as an agent of
sanction. It is important, however, to find the exact mechanisms at work by which state
power influenced the frequency and the shape of violence. Was it really a systematic and
intensified social control by the authorities that helped suppress violence? This «causal
scheme taken from the theory of civilisation …, which in its shortest forms says: more
disciplining  social  control,  hence  more  methodical  self-control,  hence  less  individual
violence» strikes even followers of a modernisation theoretical perspective as being far
too simplistic67. A slightly different light is thrown on this connection by the paradigms of
«judicial  standardisation»  and  the  «use  of  justice».  The  term  «juridification»
(Verrechtlichung), which was actually coined in the analysis of political protests in early
modern  times,  emphasizes  the  systematic  character  of  the  extension  of  the  judicial
apparatus in the early modern period68. It did not focus on the suppression of violence,
but on the extension of an attractive spectrum of alternatives to resolve conflicts in the
form of a functioning justice system which could be used by a large number of people. In
order to test this hypothesis,  a more detailed analysis of the court records would be
necessary. So far there have been only very few serial analyses for Germany; there is no
evidence for an increase of interpersonal violencebetween men of the same social group
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at the lower courts of the Fürstbistum Osnabrück since the late 17th century, but the
number of economic conflicts between the representatives of various social groups – as,
for example, between well-to-do peasants and day labourers – have predominated at this
court ever since then69.
36 Such a model, according to which informal mechanisms of social control were replaced by
formal  mechanisms,  seems  to  share  the  mechanistic  character  of  the  theory  of
civilisation. After all, such informal mechanisms of control still exist today, only – at least
in western societies – violence no longer has a central place. That is why we need to focus
more closely on the interplay between those two levels, formalised social control of the
law and informal  control  agencies  of  society,  and ask  if  and how this  interplay  has
changed over time. It is here that the concept of «the use of justice» sets in, which looks
at how the historical protagonists dealt with the old and the new institutions70. Studies
show how the options of a potential user of these institutions varied and that the decision
between violent do-it-yourself, extra-judicial settlement or a court settlement remained
dependent on the context for a long time.
37 A different explanatory model, which aims at outlining the historical change in the forms
of violence, has been proposed by Joachim Eibach. In his area of research, the imperial
city of Frankfurt in the 18th century, he detected a gradually growing social consent to
resolve conflicts peacefully. As a possible cause for this development, he sees a process of
modernisation towards a bourgeois society (Verbürgerlichung). The new forms of upper-
class social and cultural life had an increasingly shaping influence on the behaviour of the
lower  classes  of  urban  society.  The  new  ideal  of  a  distinguished  morality  and
concentrated  emotions  had  undermined the  traditional,  physically  violent  culture  of
quarrels71.  Undoubtedly  these  observations  are  inspired  by  Elias,  where  a  shaping
influence is attributed to the higher classes of society, too. Spierenburg also talks about a
pacification of  the élites as a historical  development noticeable throughout the early
modern and modern period and about a trend which left  violence at  the margins of
society.  He  illustrates  this  with  a  highly  significant  example,  namely  a  comparison
between the inner city of Amsterdam in 1700 and that of Philadelphia in 200072. No doubt
the contrast between the general acceptance of violence beyond class boundaries in early
modern times and their limitation to certain no-go-areas of big American cities, where
only outsiders and losers live, is striking73. But is it really always the upper classes and the
elites that gradually refrain from violence in conflicts? The demonstration of virility and
the exercise of violence were part of aristocratic behaviour well into the early modern
period74.  Also  urban  patricians  did  not  follow  this  model.  Neither  in  15th-century
Konstanz  nor  in  16th-century  Augsburg  did  they  attract  attention  by  an  ostensible
restraint from violence – quite the contrary75. This is even more noticeable the higher one
goes up the social  scale because members of  the elite were usually far more able to
protect  themselves  from  legal  sanctions  due  to  their  powerful  social  standing.  The
absence of a bourgeois upper class, of merchants and rentiers in the criminal statistics
may indeed be an indicator of the social distance of this group with regard to the culture
of  violence  of  craftsmen  (including  the  established  masters!).  In  Cologne,  however,
findings show a quite different pattern already for the 16th century and thus well before
the period of Verbürgerlichung in the 18 th century76. In a rural area of the 18th century,
though,  Frank  finds  an  outstanding  degree  of  violence  in  the  rural  upper  classes77.
Further research on this topic is absolutely necessary. For example, the change in social
codes and the position of violence within this context need to be analysed. Promising
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beginnings are shown by Yves Castan’s analysis for southern France, in which he notes a
shift  from the  old  code  of  ‘honneur’  towards  the  new code  of  ‘honnêteté’78.  Equally
important is the answer to the question of the extent to which religious movements and
groups, especially the process of confessionalisation, would have to be included into such
analysis79. Moreover, the decline of the culture of violent disputes among craftsmen and
peasants needs further explanation. If our hypothesis that violence is a medium of social
control is correct, then this social code must have fulfilled important functions which
were not replaceable at the drop of a hat. Did social polarisation and pauperisation in
rural areas lead to a basic change in the way people behaved in conflicts80? Are there
signs of the norms mediated by the guilds, losing their binding power or losing their
connection to honour and violence? Following Émile Durkheim, Michael Eisner has most
recently  argued that  the process  of  individualisation was an important  factor  in the
decline of violence, a process which was simultaneously marked by a liberalisation of the
binding norms of honour and shame that had been central to all groups81. Even if one
disagrees with his modernisation-theoretical perspective, one must concede that he has
formulated a hypothesis which can be a starting point for further historical research.
*
*  *
38 The basic argument of  this article can – like Spierenburg’s – be summed up in a few
sentences. The highly problematic homicide rate as a measurement is unable to certify a
long-term trend of the internalisation of interpersonal violence from the Middle Ages to
modern times. Perhaps the only provable fact is that there was a decline in that rate in
early modern times, namely in the 17th and 18th centuries. As much as Elias’ paradigm has
provided us with an important impetus for our research,  it  can hardly be applied to
finding an adequate answer to the question of what the reasons for that change really
were. By taking violence only as a blind affect, which had to be controlled by external and
internal  constraints,this  theory  prevents  us  from gaining  a  deeper  understanding  of
violence. In contrast to Elias’ bias, a historical-anthropological perspective to violence
aims  at  analysing  violence  also  as  a  medium of  social  control,  as  a  productive  and
meaningful  force,  and  as  a  social  code,  without  losing  sight  of  the  macro-historical
processes of change.
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3. Besides,  «Violence  in  Town  and  Country  since  the  Middle  Ages»  is  the  subtitle  of  this
anthology – the topic of the discussion was not crime per se, but violence. Hence, according to
the title,  the confusion between violence and criminality,  of which Spierenburg (2002, p. 95),
accuses Claude Gauvard, is also prevalent among the editors of this anthology!
4. Johnson, Monkkonen (1996, p. 6f). At another point, the second half of the 18th century is said
to have been the decisive period (8).
5. Compare Elias (1997) for an annotated new edition which also includes variations from the
1982 English translation, authorised by Elias himself; on the reception of his works, see the essays
in Rehberg (1996) and Klein, Liebsch (1997).
6. Elias (1997, pp. 365ff.).
7. Dinges (1994, pp. 328ff.; 1998); Schwerhoff (1998, 1999).
8. Crime, Histoire et Société 2000, 4, 1, pp. 135-137.
9. Sharpe (1996, p. 30); cf. his ‘observations’ in Past and Present 108 (1985), pp. 206-215.
10. Cf. Rousseaux (1999, p.145); Eisner (2001a, b); Lacour (2000, 2001).
11. This indeed is the actual focus of my previous analysis of the theory of civilisation.
12. So far, the debate has focused on the topic area of «shame and embarrassment». A discussion
would have to start from Schröter’s (1997) further considerations.
13. Compare Schwerhoff (1998b) or my essay in Blauert, Schwerhoff (2000, pp. 21-67).
14. Spierenburg (2002, p. 91).
15. I am most grateful to Manuel Eisner who kindly provided me with a version of his paper
before it was published (Eisner, 2001a; compare also Eisner, 2001b).
16. All following figures presented without an individual reference are taken either from the list
by Schüssler (1998, pp. 218ff.) or from the tables by Rousseaux (1999, pp. 159ff.) respectively.
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19. Schüssler (1998, pp. 222f.); also Simon-Muscheid (1991, pp. 30f.) and Kolmer (1997, p. 276).
20. Schuster (2000b, p. 89f.); Schwerhoff (1991, pp. 282-284).
21. Compare  Rousseaux  (1999,  p.  161) –  he  adds  up  methodologically  correctly  the  figures
presented by Vanhemelryck (1981, pp. 90-105), whereas Schüssler (1998, p. 218) wrongly states a
very low value of 41 ‘murders’.
22. Schüssler (1998, p. 219).
23. For the development of homicide from case to crime, see Rousseaux (1999).
24. Lindström (1988, p. 92). Another, banal aspect of the categorization problem is the question
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25. Given (1977, p. 30f.).
26. Eisner (2001a, p. 74).
27. Spierenburg (2001, p. 91; 1996, p. 79).
28. Schüssler (1991, p. 122). As a critique, compare Schwerhoff (1995).
29. His representation of my findings for Cologne is visually distorting in that he takes individual
years with maximum values only. Hence the homicide rate of 10 which I estimated is doubled,
compare Schüssler (1998, p. 220). Typically enough too Spierenburg (1996, p. 66) presents my
figures as «minimum rates».
30. Isenmann (1988).
31. Schultheiß (1961) no. 1008, 127.
32. Schwerhoff (1991, p. 286).
33. Even  Manuel  Eisner  as  a  follower  of  the  hypothesis  of  a  long-term  decline  of  violence
concedes  that  «due  to  the  problems  with  the  data  one  should  not  make  too  far-reaching
conclusions» Eisner (2001a, p. 84).
34. According to Eibach (1998, p. 387) there were 31 convicted offences of homicide between 1562
and 1594, whereas only 15 in the period from 1661 to 1694 and less than 10 of such convictions
during the periods from 1741 to 1773 and from 1774 to 1805 respectively. Wettmann-Jungblut
(1997) notes still  7 cases of murder or manslaughter for the small Benedictine convent of St.
Blasien with approximately 3,000 inhabitants, whereas no such case was found for the 20 years
between 1753 and 1773.
35. Spierenburg (1996, pp. 80f.).
36. For a tabular presentation of the data, it is more advisable to have separate tables for the late
16th and early 17th century and for the late 17 th and the 18th century. Additionally, contrasting
figures have been added on the one hand for Rom in the late 16th century as a rare case of very
dense material and on the other hand – rather as a supplement- the well-known data by Beattie
which is based on «softer» source material, the homicide indictments.
37. Compare, for example, Lacour (2000, pp. 88ff.).
38. Spierenburg (1996, p. 74).
39. Cockburn (1991, pp. 79ff.).
40. Compare similarly Eisner (2001 a, b).
41. Compare Blasenbrei (1995); Eisner tries to distinguish the development of violence in the
various European areas and concludes that the pioneer states of the process of modernization
England  and  Holland  were  those  in  which  the  violence  rates  declined  first.  That  this
differentiation  is  empirically provable  seems –  apart  from  the  obvious  north-south  divide,
though – questionable to me due to the data basis.
42. Spierenburg (1996, p. 67).
43. Elias (1997, pp. 151ff., pp. 331ff.). For a general discussion on the terminological specification
of «power» and «violence», see Pröve (1999).
Criminalized violence and the process of civilisation: a reappraisal
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 6, n°2 | 2009
22
44. Weber (1980, p. 29).
45. Elias (1997, p. 332); compare the English text p. 538.
46. For a  comparison of  the frequency and development of  death penalties  in early modern
Germany, for example: Behringer (1990, p. 468); and more recently Evans (1996).
47. Pröve (1999, p. 803); cf. Spierenburg (2001, p. 97).
48. Spierenburg (1994, p. 702).
49. Schwerhoff (1998a, p. 576 ff.).
50. Spierenburg (2001, p. 100).
51. Spierenburg (2001, p. 99).
52. Spierenburg (2001, p. 101f.).
53. Spierenburg  (2001,  p.  94ff.).  It  should  be  aknowledged  explicitely  in  this  context  that
Spierenburg himself has made important contributions to the phenomenology of violence.
54. Spierenburg (1994, p. 704; 1996, p. 70).
55. Spierenburg (1996, p. 94).
56. Lacour  (2000,  pp.  182ff.;  2001,  pp.  651f.).  Incidentally,  Lacour  notes  «only  a  few  major
changes» in the profile of violence for her rural area of research in West Germany between the 16
th and the 18th century – an increase in violence within the family being on of them.
57. For a detailed comparison, see Schwerhoff (2003).
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62. Rummel (1993,  p.  88).  For an overview of the respective German studies,  see Schwerhoff
(1999,  pp.  112ff.).  Furthermore,  the  programme  of  a  «historical  anthropology  of  violence»
postulated by Dinges  should be mentioned here once again.  Dinges  has  an understanding of
violence similar to Trotha’s.
63. For a more detailed analysis cf. Schwerhoff 2003).
64. Spierenburg (1997, p. 10). If the criteria of «physical violence» was to be generalized like this,
then the exclusion of certain crimes, above all infanticide, but also rape, would have to be
criticised  as  well.  This  exclusion,  too,  originates  only  from the  fact  that  certain  contexts  of
crimes can be distinguished from one another quite clearly.  Thus,  Spierenburg (1996,  p.  73),
notes that infanticide tells us less about violence than about shame and despair.
65. Fuchs (1999, p. 139ff.).
66. Apart from the works of Martin Dinges, the essay by Walz (1992) must be mentioned as a
classic  analysis  of  the  «agonal»  culture;  cf. Frank (1995b).  It  should  be  pointed out  that  the
category ‘honour’ is used here as a general category of analysis and not, as in Lacour’s works, as
one type of conflict among many others.
67. Eisner (2001a, p. 92).
68. Cf. Schulze (1982, 1983). For the connecting points between the research on crime and the
study of protests, see contributions in Häberlein (1999).
69. Kottmann (1998, p. 14).
70. Cf. Dinges (2000).
71. Eibach (1998, p. 381f.).
72. Elias (1997, vol. II., pp. 420 ff.); Spierenburg (2002, p. 101).
73. Cf. Schwerhoff (2000, p. 154f.).
74. Schindler (1992).
75. Schuster (2000a); Häberlein (1998).
76. Schwerhoff (1991, p. 185f.).
77. Frank (1995b, p. 337).
78. Cf. the discussion in Dinges (1989, pp. 425ff.).
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79. For a discussion of the paradigm of ‘confessionalization’ cf. Bahlcke, Strohmeyer (1999).
80. For hints of such a change, see Frank (1995a).
81. Eisner (2001b, pp. 91ff.).
ABSTRACTS
«Violence and the Civilising Process: Does it work?» – a question raised by Pieter Spierenburg in
a  recent  issue  of  CHS  will  be  the  reference  point  for  the  following  article.  In  contrast  to
Spierenburg my answer to this question is: ‘No, it does not’. First I comment on the validity of
late medieval and early modern ‘homicide rates’  for the development of a general history of
violence. A long-term decline in violence, as it is postulated by Spierenburg, cannot be found in
the sources. I will then deal with the role of violence within the theory of civilisation. Norbert
Elias’ interpretations are based on both a naïve reading of the source material and a simplistic
understanding of violence which regards violence as a human ‘drive’ that needs to be suppressed
by  social control.  In  the  third  and  final  part  of  this  article  I  try  to  develop  an  alternative
explanation of violence which views violence as a meaningful and culturally encoded form of
social action. Accordingly, violence should not only be perceived as an object of social control but
also as a means of social control.
«Violence  et  processus  de  civilisation:  est-ce  que  ça  marche?» –  Cette  question  soulevée  par
Pieter  Spierenburg  dans  un  numéro  récent  de  CHS  sera  le  point  de  départ  de  cet  article.
Contrairement à Spierenburg, ma réponse à cette question est: «Non, ça ne marche pas». Dans un
premier temps, je commenterai la validité des «taux d’homicides» pour le Moyen-Âge tardif et le
début de la période moderne, dans la perspective d’une histoire générale de la violence. On ne
peut  pas  trouver  dans  les  sources  le  déclin  de  la  violence  sur  le  long  terme  que  postule
Spierenburg. Puis je m’intéresserai au rôle de la violence dans la théorie de la civilisation. Les
interprétations de Norbert Elias sont basées sur une lecture naïve des sources de compréhension
simpliste de la violence, qui voit dans celle-ci une «pulsion» qui doit être réfrénée par le contrôle
social.  Dans  la  troisième  partie  de  mon  article,  j’essaierai  de  développer  une  explication
alternative de la violence, en tant que forme d’action socialement et culturellement codifiée. En
conséquence, la violence ne devrait pas être perçue seulement comme un objet mais aussi comme
un instrument de contrôle social.
AUTHORS
GERD SCHWERHOFF
Technische Universität Dresden, Institut für Geschichte Dresden – Allemagne,
gerd.schwerhoff@mailbox.tu-dresden.de
Criminalized violence and the process of civilisation: a reappraisal
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 6, n°2 | 2009
24
